This article presents Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Drawing upon the post structuralist method of deconstruction, this article identifies key persuasive strategies and thematic formations that underlie the rhetoric of Taliban. It seeks to examine how TTP contextualizes the political environment and securitizes Islamic values using identity-mediated discourse of danger to the Islam through speech acts that mediate war against the 'ideological other'-Pakistan. In addition, it attempts to expose the discursive structures upon TTP challenges counter terrorism campaign of Pakistan in an extreme manner by analyzing the articulation, interpellation, and operationalization of militant discourse-sustained through the production, distribution, and consumption of the text. Furthermore, it also discusses how master narrative of Taliban problematizes the existing context and promise to deliver revisionist solutions. Finally, article concludes that, TTP's so-called 'defensive jihad' narrative is a war legitimizing discourse-constructed on religious discursivity and sustained through language.

Discourse of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

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Pakistan Social Sciences Review

June 2020, Vol. 4, No. 2 [503-525]

P-ISSN 2664-0422

O-ISSN 2664-0430

RESEARCH PAPER

Critical Discourse Analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An

Intertextual Recontextualization

Zahid Mehmood Zahid1Khuram Iqbal2Tahir Abbas Sial3

1. PhD Scholar, Department of International Relations, National Defence University,

Islamabad, Pakistan

2. Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, National Defence

University, Islamabad, Pakistan

3. PhD Scholar, Department of International Relations, National Defence University,

Islamabad, Pakistan

Received:

April 17, 2020

Accepted:

June 15, 2020

Online:

June 30, 2020

This article presents Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Tehrik-

e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Drawing upon the post structuralist

method of deconstruction, this article identifies key persuasive

strategies and thematic formations that underlie the rhetoric of

Taliban. It seeks to examine how TTP contextualizes the political

environment and securitizes Islamic values using identity-

mediated discourse of danger to the Islam through speech acts

that mediate war against the 'ideological other'—Pakistan. In

addition, it attempts to expose the discursive structures upon TTP

challenges counter terrorism campaign of Pakistan in an extreme

manner by analyzing the articulation, interpellation, and

operationalization of militant discourse—sustained through the

production, distribution, and consumption of the text.

Furthermore, it also discusses how master narrative of Taliban

problematizes the existing context and promise to deliver

revisionist solutions. Finally, article concludes that, TTP's so-

called 'defensive jihad' narrative is a war legitimizing discourse—

constructed on religious discursivity and sustained through

language.

Keywords:

Taliban,

Identity,

Construction,

Intertextuality,

Rhetoric,

Securitization

Corresponding

Author:

zmzahid30@gmai

l.com

Introduction

Following U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and resultant War on Terror

(WoT), erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) became the new-found

home of transnational jihadis—hosting Al-Qaeda's Arab, Afghan, and Central Asian

militants (Qazi, 2011). Bin Laden's men bribed tribal elders in exchange for shelter

(Hussain, 2007). Most of the fugitives took to the South Waziristan under the

protection of Wazir tribes, who because of two decades long affiliation had developed

affinity toward both Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban (p. 58, 122).

Critical Discourse Analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Intertextual Recontextualization

504

In summer 2002, tribesmen from FATA started to participate in militant

activities against US/NATO forces in Afghanistan, notable among them were Naik

Mohammed, Abdullah Mehsud, and Sufi Mohammed. At that time Afghan Taliban

became interested in organizing an offshore chapter in FATA to sustain their

movement. Al-Qaeda also started recruitment of local tribesmen paying each rebel

$250 per month (Hussain, 2007).While these two factors encouraged the radicalization

of the locals, it was the 2002 operation by Pakistan Army against Al-Qaeda in FATA

that earned the ire of pro Al-Qaeda tribesmen creating a full-blown rebellion (Qazi,

2011).This development paved the way for future military operations (2004-2007),

culminating the formation of TTP in December 2007 (Lieven, 2011; Muzaffar et al.,

2019).

TTP, claiming to be Pakistani Taliban, was a loose conglomerate of notorious

militant groups operating from FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa under different

leaders. Baitullah Mehsud became the top commander [Ameer]; Hafiz Gul Bahadur of

North Waziristan was elected his deputy chief; Faqir Muhammad Mohmand of Bajaur

agency was third in hierarchy; and Maulana Fazalullah of Swat was also taken into the

fold as general secretary (Yusufzai, 2007).Ideologically, TTP affiliated groups shared

Sunni (Deobandi) interpretation of Islam.

The mission statement of TTP included a mixture of ideological and practical

purposes. They pledged to:

i. Liberate Afghanistan by waging Jihad against 'infidel' U.S./NATO forces.

ii. Defensive Jihad against Pakistan Army.

iii. Enforcing Shria law—a demand that made them religious warriors.

iv. Liberating Pakistani nation from U.S. 'enslavement'.

v. Abolishing security check points and forcing end of military operations.

vi. Ensuring the release of Lal Mosque cleric Abdul Aziz—this was to attract

recruits and support against the security forces (Basit, 2014;Mir, 2010; Abbas,

2008).

For these objectives, TTP used the appeals ofvictimhood, jihad, independence,

resistance, socio-economic injustices, Shria system, and pervasive impiety—interpreted

on strict Deobandi dogmas. They had pre-selected targets: social (tribal elders and

rights activists); political (politicians who believed in democracy and condemned

them); religious(Sunni religious scholars who denounced their terrorism as un-Islamic,

and Shia Muslims whom TTP regards heretics); officials, (from Law Enforcement

Agencies).These include slain figures like, Maulana Hassan Jan, Mufti Sarfraz Naeemi,

former Prime MinisterBenazir Bhutto, Bashir Bilour, and attacks on Nobel laureate

Malala Yousafzai,scores of civil-military official, social activists, journalists, and tribal

elders.

Pakistan Social Sciences Review (PSSR)

June, 2020 Volume 4, Issue 2

505

Critically speaking, emergence of the TTP was a deadly addition to the

alphabetical soup of terrorist organizations in Pakistan that influenced the national

security priorities by inflicting heavy human and material losses. It was its reign of

terror that, within few years, shifted Pakistan from being identified as the 'front-

linestate' against terrorism to presumed 'central locale of terror'(Yasmeen, 2013).Their

narrative and rhetoric during (2007-2014), shifted the attention from 'what is said' to

'how it is said' and left behind an embattled society divided between anti-Taliban and

Taliban sympathizers.

Material and Method

This study defines discourse as "social activity of making meanings

(knowledge and identity) with language (written text or spoken words)." 'Making'

refers to the 'construction', suggesting subjective ontology and interpretivist

epistemology for the claims. Under postpositivist tradition (Jorgensen, 2010),three-

dimensional Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Norman Fairclough has been

utilized (Fairclough, 1992). This approach seeks to analyze text (description); discourse

practice (text production, distribution, and consumption); and sociocultural practice

(social actions). For critical dimension and understanding social structures and

practices, this intertextual analysis incorporates Foucault's concept of power relations

to understand identity construction. Power, according to Foucault, is not always

oppressive but it should be understood as productive, it constitutes discourse,

knowledge, and subjects (Foucault, 1980).For him subjects and identities are

subjectively produced through discourses of knowing, and identities are designated

through speaking (Foucault, 1972). Language, therefore, is not a neutral device for

conveying meanings, rather performative when uttered as certain speech act (Smith,

2003).

'Critical'implies unmasking hidden connections and structures of socio-

political practices (Fairclough, 1992). Derrida's (1981) deconstruction of oppositional

binaries (Muslim/Infidel, moral/immoral, good/evil) help ordinary people

understand the relationship between discursive practices and socio-cultural

outcomes(Fairclough, 1992) . Furthermore, it provides an alternative interpretation of

the text and context.

This discourse analytical framework, when applied to analyze the militant

narrative of TTP, answers the 'how'question. Howdid TTP leadership problematize the

context through description; howdid they discursively construct WoT and Pakistan's

counter terrorism (CT) campaign as 'threat to Islam'; and how did they present the

solution by framing within which public could make sense of their social practices.

For data, I collected 68 speeches and propaganda videos (34 hours in

aggregate) of TTP leaders, released by Umar Media, media wing of TTP, and a 690

pages book 'Inqlab-e-Mehsud South Waziristan' published by TTP in 2017.The data was

collected from Counter Terrorism experts and security analysts in Pakistan. Once it

was available online; however, Government of Pakistan in her Counter Violent

Critical Discourse Analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Intertextual Recontextualization

506

Extremism campaign, removed the hateful content. After initial analysis and

transcription, I selected 46 videos and the abovementioned book for detailed analysis

of the dominant themes and patterns for truth claims. The data was then clustered into

categories and compiled for the presentation and analysis of manifest and latent

meanings to the readers.

Construction of Identity-Oriented Discourse of TTP

Identity is the difference between 'Self' and the 'Other'. In order to sustain,

identity converts the difference into otherness—the deviation (Connolly,

1991).Therefore, because of its discursive nature,'identity question' falls into the

domain of post-positivist tradition (Hansen, 2006).Similarly, TTP uses different

discursive strategies to construct the identities of Self and Othe r, based on difference and

otherization.

Pakistan's inclusion into WoT and resultant CT operations in FATA acted as

emergent causality asking for interpretation. TTP seized the opportunity and

contextualized the social world through identity-oriented discourse that mediated war

against the 'ideological other', Pakistan. They situated themselves as 'Foucauldian

subject' in the context, used existing socio-religious frames, characterized WoT and CT

operations as 'Crusade war', and constructed a defensive discourse around 'threat to

Islam' narrative and operationalized in Pakistan. Moreover, they divided the world

into 'Kufr'—bent on destroying Muslims, and 'Islam'—to be defended entity as the

religious obligation. Thereby, Pakistan's CT efforts were resisted with unsurprising

impunity.

TTP's discourse is constituted on 'us/them', 'inside/outside' and 'for/against'

discursive structures and represented in 'Muslim' versus 'infidel', 'believer' versus

'nonbeliever', 'oppressed' versus 'oppressor', 'moral' versus 'immoral', and 'saviour'

versus 'murderous' ideational binaries. These binaries are empty signifiers, but when

introduced into a context, construct the meanings around Self and Other.

Following excerpts illustrates, how identity wrapped language questioned the

Islamic credentials of Pakistan and its policies. This construction is grounded in

'believer' versus 'nonbeliever' representations that produces a faith imperative:

Pakistan was created in the name of Islam. …However, we are ruled by

heretics and U.S. puppets. …they have handed over our airbases to the

enemy of Islam – USA. These apostates [Pakistani rulers] are bombing

madrassas and mosques on the behest of America. ... an army which was

raised to defend our nation and Islam, is defending Americans (Mehsud,

2007).

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Pakistan is anun-Islamic state because its constitution is not based on

Islamic Law but founded on man-made secular laws. Therefore, flawed.

…must be replaced with Islamic one (Haqqani, 2013).

The first excerpt illustrates the 'deviance' of Pakistan from the path of

Islam by representing its relations with U.S. as 'un-Islamic' and its rulers as 'heretics'

who do the bid of U.S. against the Muslims. This narrative disarticulates Pakistani

leadership from the body of its own people and re-articulate them with the U.S. to

represent how a government serves its foreign masters at the expense of its own

people. The second in chain, further emphasize the 'un-Islamic' character of Pakistani

state by highlighting the absence of Shria as the source of law. This invocation of

religion not only necessitates the need of 'guardians of the faith' to defend Islam by

arranging actors on 'us' versus 'them' structures, but also attracts public support with

a sense of mission to defend the Islam.

You know crusade war against Islam is underway. Islam and Mujahideen

are up to a tough task. It is a contest between haq (truth) and batil

(falsity).Divine message[Islam] will not wane and wither, their [West and

Pakistan] nose will be dusted (Fazlullah, 2016).

Sharia requires every Muslim to fight against this apostate government and

change this anti-Islamic system with Islamic one (Dadullah, 2012).

In above stated excerpts, TTP leadership places 'Muslim' versus 'infidel'

identity discourse at the center of their resistance against CT efforts of Pakistan.

TTP's narrative cleverly demonized the existing politico-economic system and

persuasively articulated its opponents as criminals. It was aimed at delegitimizing the

system and re-appropriating an appeal for an alternative one:

The nation has been enslaved for the last 63 years. Criminals are ruling the

country. This system under [these] criminals has lost legitimacy; all three

pillars of the state are corrupt and have failed miserably (Rehman &

Mehsud, 2012).

People are culturally constructed in relation to the dominant ideas either as

oppressor or oppressed (Foucault, 1991).Borrowing from Foucauldian discourse,

Hakimullah portrayed ordinary masses as the subject of state repression. This rhetoric

is based on emotional appeal that renders self-innocent 'victim' versus 'wicked'

identities, constructing Pakistani state as savage with no regards for morality:

If the goal of the army in Waziristan is to make the oppressed people cry,

make orphans weep, kill people indiscriminately, force the local people to

migrate, or to bomb the mosques and madrassas.! … army have achieved

their goals! (Mehsud, 2010).

Critical Discourse Analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Intertextual Recontextualization

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For further naturalization of 'victimhood', Taliban used visual semiotics with

assertive and directive speech acts to construct an inter-subjective submissive/dominant

relationship.Their propaganda videos covered sieved bodies of Bajaur (Khan,

2006),with background melodies representing state as'oppressor'. In their

communication, images of dead bodies and wrecked houses are juxtaposed with the

images of rulers busy dining with Americans, leaving the audience to decide who is

oppressed and oppressor (Aim-tal-Kufr, 2013). This representation is supplemented by

invoking a religious image that frames Taliban 'being tested by God', as Allah tests the

Sabr (persistence) of the believers.

Since TTP lacked religious credentials, they imported and invoked Pashtun

norms Nang (dishonor) and Gherat(honor) to create an oppositional binary, 'we'

(TTP)—the Ghayyur (honorable), and 'they' (rulers)—Begherat (disgraced). Using this

vocabulary, Taliban constructed a socially esteemed masculine image of suicide

bombers as Gherti(honorable), opposed to the Begherat (disgraced) rulers of the country

(Tajik, 2010).Following statement summarizes the frame:

Begherat US allies handed over the honourable sister Afia Siddiqui, to the

infidels who stripped her naked, made fun of the dignity of the Muslim

ummah, causing us intoa painful and disgraceful condition (Mehsud,

2010).

Following statements re-strategize the history and intelligibly construct

Pakistani state as 'slave', 'mercenary', and 'immoral' as opposed to 'autonomous',

'soldier of God', and 'moral' entity that operates independently. This identity

discourse was self-legitimizing instrument that sought to gain legal status equal to that

of state. Taliban's enthusiasm for dialogue was an attempt to gain diplomatic equality

as rational actor:

We are independent in our decision making, but the government is

American slave that bombs innocent tribal people for dollars. They

demolish mosques and madrassas, violate peace deals, and allow drone

strikes within Pakistan as US accomplice (BBC, 2013).

Government violates the truces on the behest of USA. If the government is

serious …., we are open for negotiations (Mehsud, 2012).

For further internalization of nonbeliever identity of the state, TTP narrative

draws parallel with Quraish of Makkah, anti-Islam tribe of the Prophet Muhammad

PBUH that forced the early Muslims flee to the Medina. This adequation, in return,

construct TTP as the Ansar, the people of Medina who protected the defenceless

Muslims.

Al-Qaeda people are our Muslim brothers they are refuges and we are

Ansar. Our sacrifices are no less than Ansar of Madina, we lost everything,

…. still we host them (Mehsud, 2012).

Pakistan Social Sciences Review (PSSR)

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Construction of 'Other': Identity Based Discourse of Danger

The arrangement of the words 'infidel', 'heretic', 'wicked', 'oppressor', 'slave'

and Pakistan frequently appear in TTP narrative. This arrangement is then compressed

into an enemy category to construct a unified entity, 'Pakistani state.' This identity

isfurther amplified by using the discourse of danger 'the threat to Islam', that is aimed

to create sense of insecurity domestically and Taliban as the 'defenders of the faith'.

Narrative authority inflates the threat by referring to the U.S. backing of 'apostate'

rulers of Pakistan and places themselves 'against' a powerful demon 'for' Islam

simultaneously:

In 2001, USA with the help of NATO and Pakistan, attacked Afghanistan.

This was the start of a crusade war, and [President] Bush himself declared

it (Asim& Mehsud, 2017).

Taliban emirate in Afghanistan was an irritant in the way of Imperial

power, however, with the help of her ally [Pakistan], Taliban were replaced

with Western puppets [Afghan government]. …. imperial vultures are

smashing Muslim governments (Asim& Mehsud, 2017).

This 'for' versus 'against' structure placed Taliban 'in(for)' Islam in the cosmic

war of Islam and Kufr 'out(against)' the Pakistan and US. This process of securitization

cannot be done without inflating the threat to the values. Therefore, rhetoric was to be

based on religious absolutism that would leave no space for other interpretations.

TTP narrative otherizes the Westphalian nation-state system as human

construct opposed to the divine authored—Shria law. It demonizes 'popular

sovereignty' (liberal democracy) as a Western ploy to undermine the 'divine

sovereignty'. Thereby, otherizing the prevalent politico-economic system by invoking

the discourse of danger to the Islamic system and values:

Democracy is secular, hence anti Islam. We will replace it with Islamic one

that ensures collective good. Quran warns, "… who is better than Allah in

judgement for people who are certain in faith (5:50)" (Haqqani, 2013).

We have no faith in democracy. It is the best system for those who are in

power with US backing, but for us, it is kufr and satanic (Mehsud, 2012).

Pakistani system is based on disbelief. Every verdict based on this judicial

system is amount to apostacy. It is run by venial sinners who impede Shria

(Mehsud, 2012).

Aforementioned statements judge democracy and capitalism deviant from

Islam, making the case for 'legal' versus 'illegal'. To promote Islamic value system, the

success narrative of the caliphate of early days of Islam is used to convince people for

the future. This argument demands compliance for divine purpose.

Critical Discourse Analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Intertextual Recontextualization

510

Taliban held Pak-US alliance in WoT, as evil nexus against Islam. For public

consumption, they referred to the instances of their collective action—toppling the

Taliban regime in Afghanistan. TTP's discourse on Pakistan's alliance with the

Western world developed the next threat, 'secularization of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan', the only nuclear armed Muslim state, at the disposal of USA—a serious

threat to the Islam and Muslims:

A country that colluded against the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan by

helping U.S., is a clear sign of defiance from Islamic norms (Mehsud, 2012).

If she [Benazir Bhutto] formed government [American brokered and

Musharraf supported], …. she would transform Pakistan into a secular

state; therefore, she was killed (Asim& Mehsud, 2017).

Military operations have proved devastative for tribal people, people lost

their homes, Madrassas, and mosques. A nuclear capable Army is

conducting military operations in FATA for the appeasement of U.S.A.

(Rehman, 2012).

Above statements informed the people of Pakistan that their religious values and

state ideology were imperiled at the hands of an 'evil alliance'. These excerpts from

the speeches develop a logical chain, however, discursive to arrange actors by linking

the different signs to the 'other' in the language of security. It also implied that Pak-

U.S. alliance required an Islamic response for ideational objectives. For instance,

Hakimullah and Baitullah in their speeches reflected this intertextual

recontextualization to explain the threat from the non-believer 'other':

We had made up our mind, all praises to Allah, youth have risen against

kafir(infidel) America and murtad (apostate) Pakistan for the final and

decisive victory (Mehsud, 2012).

I warn U.S. allies …., stop supporting Kafir and Satanic America against

Islam, otherwise, you will face worst defeat and destruction than America

itself (Mehsud, 2010).

Baitullah's depiction of their armed struggle against 'ideological other' is

apocalyptic in which God was actively participating in earthly affairs on their side.

This also rendered jihad a spiritual import making it a battle between 'God versus

Satan'.

Operationalization of Defensive Discourse against the 'Ideological Other'

Discourses construct versions of the social world and narrative authority

present it to the people as 'truth' to the society(Campbell, 1993).However, this

production is undertaken out of the socio-cultural and linguistic material that already

have established meanings in the society(Weldes, 1999).After constructing Pakistani

state as a'clash regime', a defensive discourse was operationalized by the TTP—a'truth

Pakistan Social Sciences Review (PSSR)

June, 2020 Volume 4, Issue 2

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regime'(Moghaddam, 2011).Now, TTP leadership activates discursive categories in

their social practices as an unsurprising feature of doing things (Ferguson, 1994).This

discourse is based on the 'right of self-defense' that, when converted into practice

further internalizes the constructed reality:

Pakistan joined WoT and attacked us to gain economic assistance, subdue

tribesmen, and replacetribal system with democratic one. Naik

Mohammad and Baitullah Mehsud were compelled to act in defense of

tribal autonomy (Asim&Mehsud, 2017).

…bombing destroyed homes, madrassas, and mosques. Army wanted to

establish the writ by force; however, our resistance has not allowed this to

happen, … we will defend ourselves (Rehman, 2012).

Above statements demonstrate intelligible and persuasive construction of a

directional discourse that leaves Pakistan as an 'aggressor' to be defended against. The

construction of this defensive war narrative involves numerous value-laden discursive

structures to justify TTP's war against Pakistan as faith imperative. Similarly,

badal(revenge), a core pillar of Pashtunwali (Pashtun way of life), was also imported

into the militant discourse of TTP. This is the location where a cultural attribute gets

religious colour that allows disproportionate use of power:

English translation of Urdu melody:

"Longing martyrdom forget not to our oblations!

O' devoted, for God sake, don't forget our enemy,

Same is the enemy of our religion and honour,

Forget not my blood-soaked scarf by those, …" (Murtadeen, n.d.).

Without the retribution of the killing or humiliation, peace cannot be

ensured in the society. It is the fear of revenge that ensures peace and

justice in a society (Asim& Mehsud, 2017).

This is our first attack to avenge the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, … it is

just the beginning. We have avenged one, remain hundreds (Ahmed, 2014).

To avenge the martyrdom of Osama Bin Laden, we have carried out attacks

on Mehran Base and Shabqadar forts. …. (Khorasani, 2011)

Critical Discourse Analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Intertextual Recontextualization

512

SifwatGhayur was an apostate who had killed many Mujahideen, …we

killed him in reprisal (Karbla, 2010).

After otherizing the state, anti-state narrative requested for unity among 'us'

for the faith imperative. TTPconstructed religion 'to be defended object' in the times of

retreat against the monstrous enemy. As, "times of great injustice not only bring

people together but also cause them to behave irrationally to defend themselves"

through "self-righteous violence" (Furlow& Goodall, 2011).This rhetoric was wrapped

into educative language that reminded the audience their duty to defend Islam by

forging a united front against the Pakistan Army:

We are being bombed!We are subject to barbarism, why don't you realize

the hardships Muslims are going through, how could you stay oblivious of

the plight of your fellow Muslims? We have been humiliated, our ulema

have been killed,.…we have become so begherat (Islamabad, 2009).

Above given operationalization of defensive discourse illustrates that it is the

ideology that, as postulated by Fairclough, not only interpellated TTP as subject, but

also embedded in their discursive practices that naturalized their discourse as common

sense (Fairclough, 1992). They situated themselves as 'religious authority' in the

context and constructed the enemy image of the state through directive and commissive

speech acts (Smith, 2003), developing a casusbelli for waging a 'holy' war against the

state.

Textual analysis also revealed that how Taliban securitized (see Buzan, Wilde,

& Waever, 1998) the God and Islam (as collective identity) by representing them as

referent object facing existential threats from US and Pakistan in the pretext of WoT.

Theoretically, in the case of religious groups, securitization is not a widely

discussed theme, since securitization theory is ontologically West-centric that aims to

securitize Western values, and according to its assumptions, only powerful state actors

can securitize a referent object. However, Sheikh's work is a new addition in the field

that challenges the state monopoly over securitization and highlights the shortcomings

of the theory (Sheikh, 2018).Securitization by the powerful social/religious actors, like

in the case of Taliban, leads to a well-accepted reality, however, constructed. They, like

civil society actors in the West, convinced the public about the existence of the threat

and discursively expanded their jurisdiction as policymaker by charting out the future

direction. In the case of TTP, I believe, securitization and otherization occurs

simultaneously, as the Fig. 1 illustrates:

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TTP's discourse objectifies Islam, Shria law, madrassas and mosques as 'to be

defended' entities from the dangerous other—Pakistan and the U.S.For that matter,

Pakistan Army is reduced to mere US ally. As if their alliance with 'infidel' U.S. is the

only thing people should know and understand 'who they are'. Exactly, the way

liberal values are securitized from the terrorists in the West (Zahid, 2019),Taliban

reversely securitized Islamic values in their contest, and derive legitimacy in the

process.

The structure of identity mediated securitizing narrative of Taliban has three

parts: labelling an existential threat – X, a referent object – Y, and drawing necessary

directions – Z (Sheikh, 2018).Along these lines, securitization model reflects an

offensive defensivedirection; X – Y = Z (Existential threat posed by Pak-U.S. WoT

efforts – Islamic values = Jihad against Pakistani state). This securitization narrative

utilizes identity, ideology, fear, morality, and obligation to amplify the threat that

necessitate an indispensable defensive response—Jihad.

Recontextualization of Defensive War against the Dangerous "Other"

After operationalization of defensive discourse, TTP's narrative authority

intertextually imports inferential analogies from the past for recontextualization of

what is still vivid in the public conscious. This practice of adequation inserts history

into the text to produce a new context(Kristeva, 1975).In terms of consumption,

intertextuality not only produces the text but also help the audience interpret what is

being conveyed (Fairclough, 1992). Re-introduction of the pastin this way, allows the

subject to constitute identities in the new context as guided by the past:

Yazidi Army has unleashed their reign of terror on the people of the faith,

exactly the way Yazid did to the Hussain (Karbla, 2010).

Fig. 1 Otherization and Securitization

Critical Discourse Analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Intertextual Recontextualization

514

Tribesmen raised the banner of jihad against the British from 1849 to 1947,

they resisted the British Raj and defeated their anti-Islam system, … we

will do the same against Pakistan and U.S. (Asim&Mehsud, 2017).

Pakistan Army will meet the fate of Banu Quraiza (Jewish tribe decimated

by Muslims), as Allah is not happy with what they are doing on the behest

of infidels (Fazalullah, 2012).

Discourses tend to be reductionist and deterministic. Similarly, exclusionary

discourse of TTP used religious frames and constructed the 'savage' identity of

Pakistan Army by drawing a parallel with Yazid, Christians and Jews. This

adequation, in return, constructs TTP as 'defenders of Islam' like 'Hussain' and the

revered 'Sahabah' of the time.

Following statements refer to the era of the Prophet and discursively construct

historical continuity to create a self-serving analogy. This narrative is built on the

ideational structures 'inside versus outside' and in(for) versus out(against) that

characterize the TTP as representative of the Prophet against the Pakistani state equal

to the Quraish and Pharaoh:

We must protect our fellow Mujahideen, like Ansar did toMuhajireen

andProphet Shoaib to the Prophet Moses, when he escaped from the

Pharaoh (Haqqani, 2012).

Like Quraish, military operations [by Pakistan Army] forced people to

leave their homes (hijrat), ... (Haqqani, 2013).

Following

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Fig. 2 illustrates how TTP discourse is meaning making and action-oriented:

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Fig. 2 Discourse of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

Master Narrative of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Master narrative of TTP, appears two-fold: one, informative (constructed);

second, revisionist (ambitious).

(1) Imperial West and their ally—Pakistan, form an 'evil nexus against Islam and

Muslims'.

Secular nation-state system, liberal democracy, and capitalism are against Islam.

Social Activity of

Meaning Making

Knowledge

Discourse

Mediated Identities

Commissive

I promise that…

Interpretation

Articulation

Challenging the

official CT

discourse

Interpellation

Operationalization

Intertextuality

Power/Knowledge

Deconstruction

Speech Acts

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Pakistani rulers are apostates, corrupt, and exploitative.

Pakistan leads the crusade against Islam and Taliban are defenders of the Islam.

TTP victory in inevitable, as 'Islam cannot be defeated'.

(2) Solution lies in implementation of Shria in Pakistan and jihad against Pakistan

Army.

Presenting the Revisionist Solutions: Jihad and Implementation of Shria

Master narrative is a transhistorical narrative used to frame issues in ways that

guide attitude and behaviours (Halverson & Corman, 2011). It promises to resolve a

problem by establishing audience's expectations according to the prevalent socio-

cultural trajectories through a rhetoric which acquires a societal legitimation (Lyotard,

1992).

TTP's discourse promised the Muslims that they would use their power to

change the world according to the divine design to promote virtue against the vice. For

their revisionist program, Muslims are represented as an 'exceptional' nation that

"enjoins what is right and forbid what is wrong and believe in Allah (Quran

3:110),"hence, asking for promotion and protection of Islamic values as divine mission

that places them as guardian of Islam.This ideational self-perception is self-fulfilling

that designate TTP to punish those who challenge and show non-conformity. This

constructed rationalization questions the existing system and offers an alternative

system of utopia, roots of which rests in the past. It also casts Taliban as the torch

bearer of a political system based on Islamic identitarianism opposed to the existing

Westphalian territorialism with the divine mandate and prophetic mission to bring

people to the right path:

After Pakistan joined the war [WoT] we decided to form a powerful

alliance. … this is against the Kufr and for the Islamic Shria (Mehsud, 2012).

Our target is Sharia, ensuring welfare for everyone and every region. This

exploitative capitalist system … must be changed and Shria is the solution

(Azzam, 2013).

The first and foremost objective of our struggle is to establish caliphate on

the footings of Khilafat-e-Rashida (the guided caliphate of early four

caliphs of Islam) (Rehman, 2012).

This interpretation of the social world by Taliban leadership is ontologically

discursive and epistemologically subjective, where Ameer (leader)holds the power to

speak, whose abidance is mandatory and part of faith of the followers. Ameer thereby,

having the authority sanctioned by the faith, speaks from the position of power, reflect

in their social practices of knowledge production (Foucault, 1972).This knowledge in

Critical Discourse Analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Intertextual Recontextualization

518

return has the power to assert itself as 'truth' in social sciences (Foucault, 1980), as

depicted in the following Fig. 3:

Foucauldian Power/Knowledge Nexus

This compliance is fomented discursively by invoking religious authority—

Quran and Ahadith. Hence, a cognitive convergence takes place around an ideology—

Islam, against an antagonist ideology—Kufr/apostacy(Moghaddam, 2018).In-group

proceedings further entrench the authority of the leadership when it [group] pretends

to be in pursuit of prophetic path, leading the vulnerable Muslims against the

emboldened Kufr.

Jihad: A Religious Obligation against the Ideological 'Other'

'Jihad' in TTP's rhetoric is a 'war legitimizing' discourse (Leeuwen, 2007).Since

TTP leadership lacks soft power, they strategize 'defensive self-presentation' versus

'aggressor other presentation' (Dijk, 1993).This is instrumental legitimization in call-to-

arms discourse of TTP, as this pitches moral 'us' versus wicked 'other' creating a cult

for martyrdom among followers. This construction is constituted in jihad's output

aspect—heavenly rewards in the life hereafter. Therefore, for jihad justifications TTP

LANGUAGE

POWER

Establishes

Socio-cultural

Institutions

- Educates

- Informs

- Warns against

- Promises for

KNOWLEDGE

-Infidel

-Apostate

-Evil

-Oppressive

-Sharia

Implimentation

- Jihad

Fig. 3 Power Knowledge Nexus

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counts on existing fatwas introduced by Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda

ideologues, Abdullah Azzam. His edict individualized the concept of armed Jihad

making it individual obligation—Fard ul Ain, that requires Muslims to rise against the

infidel control of the Muslim lands (Azzam, 2002).In fact, Azzam's edict is the

combination of Fard ul Ain ofSyed Qutb (2007),near enemyof Faraj (Kenny, &Koylu,

2003),and apostacy decree of Ibn-e-Taymiyyah, resulting 'privatization of authority'

and 'globalization of jihad' in the contemporary world.

Taliban's 'jihad for Shria' rhetoric required them to invoke religious authority

of the Quran (8:39, 9:111, 61:4), though a-historically with literal sense, numbing the

cerebral capability, causing cognitive closure where individual cannot process

information and simply succumb to the temptations for Shria:

TTP's topmost objective is waging a defensive Jihad against Pakistan and

implementation of Shria (Asim& Mehsud, 2017).

Our aim is to establish Shria law. …we want to ensure the salvation of the

people through Shria, …[and] Shria cannot be ensured without Jihad

(Fazalullah, 2012).

English translation of Urdu melody:

O'the defenders of my religion, rise against this evil system.

It's time to take the sword and destroy the falsehood.

Let's be accustomed to the struggle, thus, love the land where bodies bleed

(Jamhoriat, 2013).

Jihadist narrative gives TTP foot soldier a sense of being 'Allah's chosen one',

'immortal' (Kruglanski et al., 2009), and 'part of an exalted elite' chosen to carry out

jihad (Crenshaw, 2007).Therefore, TTP leadership described them as the 'Allah's lions'

and 'slaves of the Prophet' (Fazlullah, 20120), the lexis that reflected that they were

close to the God.

Taliban's 'Jihad for Shria' Rationalization Meets a Response

TTP's lopsided interpretation and subjective recontextualization of the holy

text encountered a response from the renowned Muslim scholars, who have

vehemently denounced what TTP stands to do in the name of Islam. For instance, Dr.

Qadri(2010) decreed terror acts of TTP as un-Islamic. Rashidi pronounced, "suicide

attacks is a war weapon of the weak states [non-state actors disqualified],however,

using it in peace times, is unauthorized" (Cited by Farooq, 2009).

On the obligation of Jihad, according to Nasir (2009), "Jihad is a national duty

and state prerogative".This line of reasoning amounts to two conclusions: one,

reassertion of state by 'reclaiming the authority to declare jihad'; second, criminalizing

Critical Discourse Analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Intertextual Recontextualization

520

the efforts for transnational projects—ummah and caliphate. Hence, leaving no space

for religious militants to rally around.

Similarly, on Shria implementation, Usmani testifies that, Muslim states are

free to establish collective discipline of welfare system in their societies; hence, TTP

claims are unfounded (Nasir, 2016).Perhaps therefore, to hold some legitimacy, TTP

leadership invoked near enemy thesis, "there is no legitimate Islamic government in the

Muslim world, since all Muslim rulers have reneged to apostasy". Even on this

question, Ghamidi(2018) argues that Allah considers apostasy asin, and only Allah

[emphasis added] can punish the perpetrators in the world and in life hereafter. No

government, group, or individual have jurisdiction to declare a person—infidel, leave

alone punishing or killing.

On state level, in May 2017, a body of 1829 Islamic scholars and academics

issued a unanimous Fatwa holding armed struggle in the name of Islam and

implementation of Shria, categorically illegal and forbidden (Paigham-e-Pakistan,

2018).This Fatwa is strongly backed by the Quran (4:93, 4:29, 5: 33-34, 49:9) and

Hadith(Sahih al-Bukhari 5333; Sahih Muslim,158, 4768) references.

Conclusion

Using poststructuralist method of deconstruction, two overarching areas have

been analyzed herein: one, critical analysis of the patterns of discourse production,

distribution, andconsumption; second, master narrative of TTP that promised

revisionist 'jihad for Shria' solution. Based on the totalizing narrative of religion, TTP's

rhetoricotherizedPakistani state by representing it as existential threat to Islam and

designated following identities:

Discourse-Mediated Identities of TTP and Pakistani State

Ummah (Islamic identitarianism)

Westphalian territorialism

'for' Divine-authored Shria

'for' man-made secularism

After discursive construction of a dangerous ideologicalother, narrative

authority operationalized a defensive discourse to mediate war as'faith imperative'

against Pakistan. This construction is ideologically driven, zero-sum in practice, and

Pakistan Social Sciences Review (PSSR)

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hierarchic in structure: where, 'inside' rules over 'outside', 'good' over 'bad', and

'Islamic' over 'secular'—leaving no option for co-existence. At the same time, TTP

leadership securitized 'Islamic values' by representing the signs of the looming threats

of secularism, imperial connections, and liberal democracy to the Islam. That in turn

re-appropriated an armed response against Pakistan. Taliban imported notorious anti-

Islam figures from the past and recontextualized them in the present context that

equated Pakistan Army with Yazid, Pharaoh, Britishers, and Quraish. This identity

adequation constructed a context that demanded'jihad' against the 'tyrant of today',

Pakistani state. However, discredited by contemporary Islamic scholars, as war

legitimizing discourse constructed on literalism and sustained through language.

Overall, Taliban's discourse is exclusionary and revisionist; however, utopian

in its solutions prescription. Like other dogmatic discourses, this militant discourse is

also reductionist, deterministic, and founded on ideational auxiliaries. Rooted in

religion, this discourse produced meanings, constituted identities, created social

effects, and shaped political outcomes during since 2007.

Religious conservatism born out of the triumphal sweep against the 'godless'

communists during 1980s and Taliban's rise in Afghanistan in 1990s raised the specter

of the 'religious figure'—the norm entrepreneur equal to the philosopher king of Plato,

that shifted the social hierarchy in favor of 'Mulla' against the 'Malik' in the post 9/11

tribal belt of Pakistan. Religion, in the presence of ethnic and religious commonality,

became the political tool of inclusion and TTP attracted people by attributing to the

victories in Afghanistan as the sign of 'Allah being on their side'. Finally, this article

finds TTP claims ontologically discursive and epistemologically subjective; hence, [a]

constructed 'reality' that was made to look 'objective' inter-subjectively and

operationalized through religious images. Therefore, this deconstructive explanation,

calls for alternate interpretations of the militant phenomenon through psychological

and social prisms.

Critical Discourse Analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Intertextual Recontextualization

522

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  • Mona Kanwal Sheikh

This article contributes to the larger debate on how to increase the cultural sensitivity in IR analyses, and particularly how the securitization theory can face some of the criticism relating to its embedded-ness in the West. The article shows that the expanding empirical application of securitization theory by scholars around the world, as well as the theoretical expansion (the opening of the religion sector) raise two important, but different questions, which are about potential a) limitations in the applicability of the theory on non-western cases, and b) west-centric biases in the design of the theory. This article sheds light on both types of criticisms by asking whether securitization theory is applicable to study the case of religious violence as I have done in earlier studies of the Pakistani Taliban, and by evaluating the assumptions and consequences of keeping with a west-centric concept of religion. The article makes three points: First, it shows that the theory's meeting with the Islamist case challenge the theory's conceptualization of securitization as a defensive narrative only. Second, it points at the limitations in the way religion has been conceptualized by the theory's proponents. Third, it argues that dealing with differences in the interpretations of political realities is an important element of the call to increased cultural sensitivity, and in this endeavour the securitization framework would gain from elements of worldview analysis.

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This is a major new edition of a highly regarded textbook on International Relations theory which combines coverage of the main contending theories and approaches with cross-cutting coverage of key current issues and debates; of the philosophical foundations of IR theory; and of why different theories are addressed to different research agendas.

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However great the diversity, the irregularity, the disparity even of current research in semiotics, it is possible to speak of a specifically semiotic discovery. What semiotics has discovered in studying 'ideologies' (myths, rituals, moral codes, arts, etc.) as sign-systems is that the law governing or, if one prefers, the major constraint affecting any social practice lies in the fact that it signifies; i.e., that it is articulated like a language. Every social practice, as well as being the object of external (economic, political, etc.) determinants, is also determined by a set of signifying rules, by virtue of the fact that there is present an order of language; that this language has a double articulation (signifier/signified), that this duality stands in an arbitrary relation to the referent; and that all social functioning is marked by the split between referent and symbolic and by the shift from signified to signifier coextensive with it.